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THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CUMULATIVE ABORTION
REGULATIONS: WHY THE 5TH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG IN
UPHOLDING REGULATIONS ON MEDICATION ABORTIONS
(PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS SURGICAL
HEALTH SERVICES V. ABBOTT)1
Benjamin A. Hooper*

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine having a sixteen year-old daughter who is pregnant and
wishes to terminate the pregnancy. The closest abortion clinic is
seventy-five miles away and the state you live in requires a
mandatory 24-hour waiting period. On top of that you have no health
insurance and cannot afford to take off work. This is the exact
situation in which Jennifer Whalen found herself, and as a result of
her actions she is now currently serving a nine to eighteen month
prison sentence.2
Whalen was faced with the above scenario and decided to purchase
abortion pills online for her daughter.3 When her daughter began to
show symptoms of bleeding, Whalen took her to the hospital.4
Though the bleeding was the result of a miscarriage, and no serious
health issues were present, Whalen was charged with a felony for
offering medical consultation without a license along with three
misdemeanors.5 With increasing regulations being passed by a
number of states, abortion clinics have been forced to shut down.
This has caused many women to find themselves in similar situations
to Whalen’s with no affordable or practical access to abortion
providers.6
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,
holding that a woman’s right to abortion is protected under the
Constitution, the topic of abortion has been a highly contested and
* Associate Member, 2014–2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).
2. Emily Bazelon, A Mother in Jail for Helping Her Daughter Have an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/magazine/a-mother-in-jail-for-helping-herdaughter-have-an-abortion.html/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Esmé E. Deprez, The Vanishing Abortion Clinic, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 27,
2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-27/abortion-clinics-face-shutdown-spiral-asrepublicans-push-restrictions/. “Since 2011, legislatures in 30 mostly Republican-controlled states have
passed 203 abortion restrictions, about as many as in all of the prior decade. At least 73 clinics have
closed or stopped performing abortions.” Id.
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controversial issue throughout the United States. The current
political climate in the United States has helped reignite the fight
over abortion with many politicians taking hardline views on the
issue. For example, former Texas Governor Rick Perry stated that
“he hopes to make abortion a thing of the past.”7
Though abortion is legal in the United States, “in practice 87% of
counties in the United States do not have a single abortion provider.”8
This lack of providers can be attributed to a number of different laws
and regulations that states have put in place related to abortion over
the years. For example, almost half of all states now have a 24-hour
waiting period for abortions.9 The most stringent states, South
Dakota, Utah and Missouri, have implemented a 72-hour waiting
period.10 This fierce debate over abortion has caused a “lattice work
of abortion law.”11 Some additional types of abortion regulations
that are notable include: licensing requirements for physicians,
requirements for abortion procedures to be performed in a hospital,
gestational limits, insurance coverage, requirements of parental
involvement, and regulations requiring state-mandated counseling.12
While abortion remains legal in the United States, the intricate web
of regulations enacted by various states have resulted in the closure
of a large number of abortion clinics and have restricted women’s
access to abortion providers, particularly impacting women who live
in rural areas.13
Some of the more recent fights over the
constitutionality of abortion laws have arisen with the passing of new
laws requiring physicians to have hospital admitting privileges, 14 as
well as laws requiring abortion providers to follow the on-label
regimen of certain abortion medications.15
7. Erik Eckholm, Judge in Texas Partly Rejects Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (October 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/us/judge-blocks-part-of-texas-abortion-law.html/.
8. Quinn Cummings, Making Abortions Illegal Doesn’t Make Them Go Away, TIME (Sept. 24,
2014), http://www.time.com/3423785/illegal-abortions/.
9. Kate Pickert, What Missouri’s New Abortion Law Means for Women, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.time.com/3323608/missouri-lawmakers-enact-72-hour-abortion-wait/.
10. Id.
11. Guttmacher INT., State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws (2013), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf/.
12. Id.
13. Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Abortion Providers in Texas Press Judge to Block
Portions of New Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/us/texasabortion-providers-press-judge-to-block-curbs-in-new-law.html/.
14. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir.
2014); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that
requiring abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges was unconstitutional).
15. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2014); Planned
Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 696 F.3d 490, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood of
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). See also Humble, 753 F.3d
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This Casenote examines the circuit split surrounding the
constitutionality of these “medication abortion” laws, while focusing
on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Greater
Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott. In Abbott, the Fifth Circuit
upheld a law requiring physicians to follow the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved “on-label” regimen for medication
abortions.16 Part II of this Casenote provides an overview of the
background on how medication abortions emerged as an option and,
the two different regimens in question, and it explains the legal
precedent governing abortion and abortion regulations. Part III
examines the procedural history and decisions of the Fifth Circuit
case, as well as decisions by the Sixth and Ninth Circuit on this issue.
Part IV analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s decision and illustrates where the
Fifth Circuit went wrong. Finally, Part V concludes that to
adequately determine whether regulations that require physicians to
follow the on-label regimen for medication abortions place an undue
burden on women’s ability to receive appropriate healthcare, courts
need to take a broader look at the cumulative effect of regulations
already in place.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Abortion Law

The Supreme Court first established a woman’s right to have an
abortion in Roe v. Wade.17 In Roe, the Court held that a Texas statute
outlawing abortion except in cases where the mother’s health was at
risk violated the Constitution.18 The Court held that the statute was
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty and
that a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion fell within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection.19 In particular, the Court found
that the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a right of personal
privacy and that a woman’s right to abortion falls into this category.20
Though the Court did establish the right to abortions, it did not
establish an absolute right to the procedure.21
at 909 (explaining that the “on label” protocols for drugs are those which are submitted by
manufacturers and subsequently approved by the FDA).
16. See generally Abbott, 748 F.3d.
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Id. at 166.
19. Id. at 153.
20. Id. at 154.
21. Id. at 155.
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The Court held that “this right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.”22 To
address a state’s interests in regulating abortions at different stages of
a woman’s pregnancy, the Court established a trimester framework.23
The Court noted that when regulating rights that are “fundamental”,
such regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and must serve a
compelling state interest.24
Following this approach, the Court held that, during the first
trimester, the decision should be left up to the woman and the
medical judgment of her physician.25 The Court further explained
that a state may introduce minor regulations on abortion, but the
regulations must not restrict a woman’s choice to have an abortion.26
However, the Court held, that during the second trimester, a state’s
interest is greater and therefore, “a State may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the
preservation and protection of maternal health.”27 Finally, the Court
held that during the third trimester, a state has a compelling interest,
and, therefore can “go so far as to proscribe abortion,” except in
cases where abortion is necessary to preserve the health or life of the
mother.28
The Court’s trimester analysis remained good law for 19 years
until the Supreme Court ruled on yet another abortion case in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.29 Casey centered on a Pennsylvania
statute which required that a woman seeking an abortion (1) be
provided with certain medical information twenty-four hours prior to
an abortion procedure; (2) if a minor, have the informed consent of
one parent; and (3) if married, have a signed statement from her
husband consenting to the abortion.30 In its analysis, the Court
abandoned the trimester approach but maintained the central holding
set forth in Roe.31 In reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the
Court outlined three essential takeaways: (1) women have a right to
choose to have an abortion before viability without undue
interference from the state; (2) states have power to impose
regulations after viability; and (3) states have a legitimate interest in
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id at 154.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 164–65.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 846.
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protecting the health of the mother and child from the onset of
pregnancy.32
While striking down the previous trimester analysis set forth in
Roe, the Court established an undue burden standard for abortion
regulations imposed before the point of viability.33 The Court held
that a regulation or law is an undue burden when “its purpose or
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”34 The Court
emphasized that states have a “profound interest” in protecting
potential life and therefore, the “rigid trimester approach” needed to
be replaced to give states the opportunity to take measures that would
inform and potentially persuade women to choose childbirth over
abortion.35 The Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard paved
the way for new abortion laws to be passed and for states to test the
waters regarding what actually constituted an undue burden under
this new standard.
The next piece of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue arose
in 2007 with Gonzales v. Carhart where the Court reversed the
decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
and upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (the Act).36
The Act prohibited a particular type of abortion, namely the surgical
procedure known as “Dilation and Evacuation” or “D&E.”37 This
type of abortion is most commonly used for second trimester
abortions.38 The Court held that the Act did not place an undue
burden on women who were seeking abortion as there were other
alternatives available to them.39 Specifically, the Court noted that
“physicians are not entitled to ignore regulations that direct them to
use reasonable alternatives.”40
In addition to upholding the Act, the Court also reshaped the undue
burden analysis by stating that “where [a State] has a rational basis to
act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may bar
certain procedures, and substitute others, all in furtherance of its
legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession.”41 In
32. Id.
33. Id. at 878.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
37. Id. at 136.
38. Id at 135. The procedure is performed by first dilating a woman’s cervix to allow for a
doctor to then insert surgical instruments into the uterus and to then evacuate the fetus.
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id at 163.
41. Id. at 158.
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essence, a state can put in place a regulation as long as that regulation
has a rational basis and does not place a substantial obstacle in the
way of women seeking abortions.42
Further, the Court upheld the Act even though it did not have an
exception in place for when a mother’s health or life is at risk.43
Again, the Court relied on the availability of alternatives in holding
that the exclusion of this exception did not make the Act invalid on
its face.44 Additionally, the Court held that there was not enough
medical evidence to demonstrate that the prohibition of this specific
type of abortion would place a significant health risk upon women.45
Instead, the Court held that state and federal legislatures should be
given wide discretion in passing legislation regarding medical
uncertainty over potential health risks.46
The evolution of abortion jurisprudence over the years has worn
away many of the protections originally afforded to women. The
holding in Casey whittled down the strict scrutiny imposed by the
holding in Roe,47 and the holding in Gonzales opened the door for
many states to begin passing piecemeal regulations that have begun
to disrupt the availability of abortion providers.48
B. The FDA’s Process for Approving Drugs

When a drug is submitted to the FDA for approval, the FDA does
not independently test the drug.49 Instead, the pharmaceutical
company who is manufacturing the drug will perform its own tests
and determine an on-label regimen that it believes is safe for use.50
The manufacturer then sends those results to the FDA for approval51
and the FDA independently reviews the results of such tests and

42. Id.
43. Id. at 166–67.
44. Id. at 166.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 163.
47. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
48. David Masci, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, PEW RES.
CENTER (Jan. 16, 2013) http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-rulings-ofthe-us-supreme-court/. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Carhart a number of states stepped up
regulations including 10 states which passed laws requiring the performance of ultrasounds procedures
prior to an abortion.
49. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FED. DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentAppr
ovalProcess/ (last visited October 26, 2014).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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decides whether the drug should be approved.52 The manufacturer
will send a proposed label to the FDA which indicates how
physicians should use the drug in accordance with the tests sent to the
FDA.53 Though the FDA approves only the on-label use of drugs, it
is commonly expected that many drugs will be used off-label at the
discretion of medical doctors.54 Estimates suggest that of all the drug
products prescribed each year, over 25 percent are off-label uses with
some estimates reaching as high as 60 percent.55 The FDA has gone
as far as explicitly recognizing the importance off-label use of drugs
stating, “once a product has been approved . . . a physician may
prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations
that are not included in approved labeling.”56 Further, Congress has
exempted the practice of medicine from the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which oversees the safety of food and drugs, in order
to avoid limiting a physician’s ability to treat patients.57 Similarly,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that off-label use of
drugs and devices approved by the FDA are generally left to the
discretion of medical doctors.58
C. The Rise of Medication Abortions

In 2000, the FDA approved the drug Mifepristone for use in
medication abortions under the brand name Mifeprex.59 Prior to the
FDA’s approval of Mifepristone, most first-trimester abortions were
surgical and were performed by a procedure commonly known as
vacuum aspiration or suction curettage.60 Over the past fourteen
years, however, medication abortions have become a more common
choice for doctors performing first-trimester abortions. Planned
Parenthood has reported that medication abortions now account for
41 percent of all first-trimester abortions nationwide.61 When the
FDA approved the use of Mifepristone in medication abortions they

52. Id.
53. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2014).
54. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent:
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 Food Drug L.J. 71, 76–80 (1998).
55. Id. at 80.
56. Id. at 77.
57. Id. at 79.
58. See generally Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, (2001). The Supreme
Court noted that the FDA’s mission is to regulate without interfering with the practice of medicine. The
use of off-label regimens and devices is a necessary corollary of this mission.
59. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 2014).
60. Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 696 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2012).
61. Humble, 753 F.3d at 908.
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also established a drug label that described an “on-label” regimen
that the manufacturers of the drug recommended.62 Though the FDA
approved the “on-label” regimen, many studies had already shown
that a different regimen is also safe and effective to use for
performing medication abortions.63 In response to these two different
regimens, state legislatures have begun to pass laws requiring
abortion providers to follow the “on-label” regimen as approved by
the FDA.64
D. Mifepristone and the Differing Protocols

The most common method of medication abortion employs a
combination of two prescription drugs, Mifepristone and
Misoprostol.65 Mifepristone is taken first and “terminates the
pregnancy by detaching the gestational sac from the uterine wall.”66
Misoprostol is then taken twenty-four to forty-eight hours later and
causes the uterus to “contract and expel its contents.”67 The “onlabel” procedure for this combination of drugs indicates that a
woman should first take 600 milligrams of Mifepristone orally at a
clinic, return two days later to take an additional 400 micrograms of
Misoprostol, and then return again for a follow-up visit.68 The FDA
procedure also states that the medication should only be given to
women who are up to seven weeks pregnant, or forty-nine days from
the woman’s last menstrual period (LMP).69
In contrast to this protocol, a second protocol was established
through additional clinical trials of the drugs. This second protocol is
commonly referred to as the “evidence-based regimen” or the “offlabel regimen” and varies from the “on-label” protocol approved by
the FDA.70 The off-label regimen calls for 200 milligrams of
Mifepristone to be administered orally at a clinic followed by 800
micrograms of Misoprostol to be administered orally two days later

62. Id. at 907.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 909; See also Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott 748
F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing H.B.2 which mandates that the administration of abortion
inducing drugs comply with the protocol authorized by the FDA); See also Dewine, 696 F.3d at 495
(discussing Ohio’s ban on off-label use of mifepristone).
65. Humble, 753 F.3d at 907.
66. Dewine, 696 F.3d at 494.
67. Humble, 753 F.3d at 907.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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through dissolving of the drug between the cheek and gum.71 Under
this regimen, the Misoprostol can be taken at home instead of at a
clinic and a patient then has a follow-up visit to a clinic after the
treatment has been completed.72 This regimen has been found to be
safe and effective through nine weeks of pregnancy, or sixty-three
days LMP, allowing for more women to have access to this method
of abortion.73
A 2013 study examining the previous six years of data, found that
out of 711,566 medication abortions following the evidence-based
regimen, there were no infection-related deaths resulting from the
combination of drugs.74 Additionally, the failure rate for termination
of pregnancy for the on-label regimen was found to be 1 percent,
while the failure rate for the evidence-based regimen was around 0.5
percent.75 The on-label regimen also results in the need for
subsequent surgical abortions in about eight percent of women, while
fewer than two percent of women who have followed the evidencebased regimen have required subsequent surgical abortions.76
Finally, the additional required visit to administer the Misoprostol in
accordance with the on-label regimen, as well as the higher doses that
are required, raises the overall cost of the procedure in comparison to
the evidence-based regimen.77
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio Region v. Dewine
1. The District Court Decision

In 2004, Ohio passed a law that criminalized the prescription and
distribution of Mifepristone and Misoprostol for use in abortion
procedures unless the distribution was done in accordance with
certain protocols and time limits approved by the FDA.78 In response
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 908. See James Trussell et al., Reduction in Infection-Related Mortality Since
Modifications in the Regimen of Medical Abortion, 89 Contraception 193, 195 (2014). This study
consisted of data gathered from Planned Parenthood centers across the United States and tracked the
complications arising from medication abortions after the procedure had changed from vaginal
administration of Misoprostol to oral administration.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 696 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2012).
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to this legislation, Planned Parenthood’s Ohio regional clinics and
two of its doctors brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Planned Parenthood made four separate constitutional
law.79
arguments, three of which the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.80 These three constitutional
challenges were then appealed to the Sixth Circuit to determine: (1)
whether the Act was unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether the Act
violated a woman’s right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (3) whether the Act imposed an undue burden on a
woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to choose to have an
abortion.81
2. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo.82 Based on its review, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding of summary judgment that the Act was not
Planned Parenthood argued that
unconstitutionally vague.83
physicians would be confused by the language included within the
Act, as well as the four documents contained within the “final
printing label,” and, therefore, physicians would be unable to
understand what the Act was prohibiting.84 The court, ultimately,
rejected this view because the Ohio Supreme Court had previously
interpreted the statute and specified what it prohibited.85 This
interpretation was then subsumed within the Act because “when a
state’s highest court interprets a statute, its construction is considered
part of the statute itself.”86
The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s ruling of
summary judgment on Planned Parenthood’s bodily integrity claim.87
Creatively, Planned Parenthood argued that the Act was parallel to a
forcible physical intrusion because women who wish to have a
medication abortion between fifty and sixty-three days after their
LMP are forced to undergo surgery under this Act.88 This type of
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 506.
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forcible intrusion would therefore require a compelling state interest,
which Planned Parenthood argued was not present.89 The Sixth
Circuit dismissed this argument stating that “strict scrutiny, of
course, no longer applies to abortion legislation”90 and that the
Supreme Court has made clear that these types of questions are
analyzed under the undue-burden framework rather than a return to a
stricter balancing standard.91
In regard to the undue burden claim put forward by Planned
Parenthood, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding on
summary judgment that the Act does not place an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to receive an abortion.92 The court relied, in part, on
the fact that medication abortions are preferred by only 31 percent of
women to whom it is available and, therefore, is less likely to pose an
issue. In support of this notion, the court referenced Gonzales v.
Carhart, stating “that state action is likely to constitute an undue
burden where the most common abortion technique . . . is
prohibited.”93 The court concluded that the Constitution protects a
woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy but does not
protect her preferred method of choice.94 Accordingly, the court
focused on the amount of women who choose this procedure and
determined that the Act does not place a substantial obstacle in the
way of a woman’s ultimate choice to terminate her pregnancy.95
B. Planned Parenthood of Arizona v. Humble
1. The District Court Decision

Two years after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Dewine, the Ninth
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a similar type of
legislation.96 Parallel to the Ohio law, Arizona’s legislation regulated
medication abortions by requiring doctors to follow the protocol
approved by the FDA and outlined in the final printing label. 97 This
legislation was challenged by Planned Parenthood of Arizona, who

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 506–07.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 516.
Id.
See generally Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 909.
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sought a preliminary injunction against the law.98 Following in the
Sixth Circuit’s footsteps, the district court denied the preliminary
injunction and relied on the availability of surgical abortions as
grounds for dismissing the possibility of any undue burden caused by
The district court concluded that Planned
the legislation.99
Parenthood was not entitled to a preliminary injunction because it
had failed to establish any question that was likely to succeed on the
merits.100
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion.101 Planned Parenthood’s main
argument was that the legislation imposes an undue burden upon a
woman’s right to abortion.102 In addressing this argument, the Ninth
Circuit criticized the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ analyses in holding that
legislation requiring doctors to follow the FDA protocol did not place
an undue burden upon women.103 The Ninth Circuit emphasized, that
in making this determination, both Circuit’s applied rational basis
review but then failed to pay attention to whether the regulation
actually advanced the state interest the legislation was allegedly
created for.104 Specifically, the court noted that the burden that an
abortion regulation imposes on a woman needs to be compared with
the strength of the state justification for which the law is being
claimed to serve.105
The Ninth Circuit focused on this reasoning, maintaining that
“the more substantial the burden, the stronger the state’s justification
for the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test.”106 Arizona’s
purported justification for this legislation was to protect a mother’s
life.107 The main factors considered were the increased dosages that
the final printing label required,108 the increased cost and travel time

98. Id. at 910.
99. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31,
2014).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1026.
Humble, 753 F.3d at 910.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 915.
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associated with the on-label regimen,109 evidence demonstrating that
clinics would likely close as a result of the law,110 and evidence that
the legislation may delay abortions which would result in increased
health risks for women.111 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit determined
that Planned Parenthood was likely to succeed on the merits of the
undue burden claim as a result of these factors and, therefore,
reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case back to the
district court with instructions to issue the preliminary injunction.112
C. Main Case: Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical
Services v. Abbott
1. The District Court Decision

Shortly before the Ninth Circuit’s decision, legislation was passed
in Texas that restricted the use of abortion inducing drugs.113 Similar
to the Ohio and Arizona laws, the Texas law, House Bill 2 (H.B. 2),
required that abortion-inducing drugs comply with the protocol
authorized by the FDA.114 The district court held that the law placed
an undue burden on women who will seek an abortion after fortynine days from their LMP where, in the medical opinion of a doctor,
a medical abortion is the safest option and would therefore require a
doctor to follow the off-label regimen.115 The district court reasoned
that this law could interfere with the safety of a mother’s life because
certain health conditions or physical abnormalities prevent women
from safely undergoing surgical abortions.116 The court stated that
for women who suffer from these conditions, the restrictions on
medical abortions serve as a complete ban after forty-nine days from
their LMP because of the significant health risks that would be
associated with a surgical abortion.117 The district court granted an
injunction against enforcement of the legislation on medical
providers who chose to follow the off-label regimen for women who

109. Id at 916.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 918.
113. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott 748 F.3d 583, 587 (5th
Cir. 2014)
114. Id.
115. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891,
908 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
116. Id. at 907.
117. Id at 908.
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are between fifty to sixty-three days from their LMP.118
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s holding to
determine whether the district court erred in finding that the H.B. 2
placed an undue burden on the abortion rights of women seeking an
abortion from fifty to sixty-three days from their LMP and, in the
opinion of a doctor, could not safely undergo a surgical abortion.119
In its description of the off-label protocol, the court seemed to be
surprised by the notion that many medical professionals across the
country preferred the off-label regimen rather than the FDA approved
on-label regimen.120 The court appeared to give strong deference to
the FDA protocol and failed to mention the Humble court’s findings
that off-label uses of medication are extremely common and have
even been acknowledged by the FDA as “sometimes required by
good medical practice.”121 The Fifth Circuit went on to hone in on,
what it described as, the “hypotheses and speculation” of the district
court to determine that restrictions on medical abortions do not
facially impose an undue burden on women seeking an abortion.122
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a facial attack on the
constitutionality of the provision was untenable and that the
argument would need to be brought in an as applied challenge.123
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzales.124 In particular, the court
reasoned that the restrictions placed upon medication abortion did not
restrict an entire type of abortion but, rather, just a specific time
period allowing women the opportunity to pursue alternative abortion
procedures.125 Though the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision, it failed to make an actual determination as to whether the
Texas law would place an undue burden on women who suffer from
certain conditions and whom doctors believe cannot safely undergo
surgical abortions.126
118. Id. at 909.
119. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott 748 F.3d 583, 586 (5th
Cir. 2014)
120. Id. at 600.
121. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2014).
122. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 604 (5th
Cir. 2014).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 605.
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IV. DISCUSSION: WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT REACHED THE WRONG
CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit’s determination that H.B. 2 does not facially
impose an undue burden on the abortion rights of some women was
inherently flawed.
In reaching this conclusion, the court
misconstrued the proper standard required for such a finding and also
failed to take into consideration all relevant factors. The court’s
approach to this analysis was problematic in a number of ways. First,
the court failed to utilize the undue burden standard correctly.
Second, the court overlooked the cumulative effects of abortion
regulations were placing upon women. Finally, the court failed to
recognize the true role of the FDA in approving drugs and the
discretion that is still awarded to medical professionals. All of these
shortfalls suggest that a new approach may be needed when
analyzing abortion regulations.
A. The Fifth Circuit Failed to Utilize the Undue Burden Standard
Correctly
1. The Court Failed to Consider the Strength of the State Interest
Being Pursued

One of the largest concerns with the Fifth Circuit’s determination
is the failure of the court to take into account the balancing test
required under the undue burden standard set forth by the Supreme
Court. Instead of comparing the burden created by H.B. 2 against the
state interest the law was allegedly created to protect, the Fifth
Circuit focused merely on whether there was a rational basis for the
legislation and went no further. This approach fails to consider one
of the most important aspects of the undue burden analysis: whether
the burden placed upon women’s access to abortions is greater than
the state interest being protected.
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit noted that the alleged purpose of
the Texas law was the protection of maternal health, rather than the
health of potential fetal life.127 This is supported by the State’s
inclusion of evidence from Dr. Harrison, which focused on the
mother’s health.128 Nonetheless, the court focused purely on
Gonzales in drawing a supposed parallel when asserting that the
legislation passes a rational-basis review. Texas purports that the

127. Id. at 590.
128. Id. at 602.
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legislation is meant to protect the life of the mother but then fails to
take into consideration whether placing limits on the availability of
medication abortions really does protect a woman’s health. The
court relies on the assertion that there was a lack of evidence
presented by Planned Parenthood to allow for the district court to
come to the conclusion that women would be unable to receive a
medication abortion before the 49-day LMP window closes.129
Though the Fifth Circuit focuses on a supposed lack of evidence, it
then fails to present any evidence itself. The Fifth Circuit stressed
that decisions must be based on “facts, not hypothesis and
speculation,” but then went on to speculate about the strength of the
legislation. Instead, the court avoids having to make any sort of real
determination by simply stating that an as applied challenge is
necessary before an actual determination can be made about the
burden the law places upon women.130
The Fifth Circuit’s avoidance of this issue was clearly flawed. The
Fifth Circuit should have followed the same reasoning applied by the
Ninth Circuit and focused on balancing the strength of the state
interest against the burden being placed upon women.131 There is no
question that H.B. 2 places an obstacle in the path of women seeking
abortions. The question is whether that burden outweighs the
purported health benefits the bill was created to protect. The Fifth
Circuit missed the mark in this case by avoiding this question
altogether and relying solely on Gonzales to find that because the law
was only placing a burden on the choice of preferred procedure,
rather than a blanket burden on all types of abortion, it was not
facially unconstitutional.132
The Fifth Circuit failed to analyze whether this restriction on
medication abortions would really have the effect of protecting the
health of mothers. The court relied on the lack of concrete evidence
regarding medical conditions or abnormalities that would put women
at risk for surgical abortions133 but failed to consider that doctors
should have the ultimate choice in determining what they believe is
the safest procedure for their patients. In its opinion, the court noted
that there is “disagreement over whether medication abortions are
safer [for at-risk women], at least when subsequent emergency

129. Id. at 604.
130. Id.
131. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2014).
132. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 604 (5th
Cir. 2014).
133. Id.
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surgical abortions are necessary.”134 This type of decision-making
about the correct procedure for individual patients needs to be left to
the discretion of doctors, not legislators. By limiting the window of
availability for medication abortions the Fifth Circuit is putting this
discretion in the hands of lawmakers rather than trained medical
professionals who can better determine the best treatment for their
patients on a case-by-case basis.
2. The Court’s Analysis Failed to Examine the Effectiveness of the
Law

The Fifth Circuit’s failure to apply the correct balancing test was
coupled with the omission of any real look into the effectiveness the
Texas law had towards reaching its stated purpose. Current medical
statistics show that medication abortions rarely result in
complications135 and are often preferred by women because,
following the off-label protocol, the second dose of medication can
be taken in the privacy of one’s own home. In fact, medication
abortions now account for forty-one percent of all first-trimester
abortions nationwide.136 Further, a study conducted in 2009 found
that medication abortions present little to no risk to the health of
women when the combination of Misoprostol-Mifepristone drugs are
used between fifty to sixty-three days from a woman’s LMP.137 The
study also found that the chance of successful terminations was found
to be 98.3 percent when the combination of drugs was used within
sixty days or less from a woman’s LMP, while it was found that the
procedure was 96.8 percent effective for all procedures performed on
women below fifty days from their LMP.138 Additionally, new
changes in the administration of the second drug, Misoprostol, has
reduced the risk of serious infections related to the procedure to as
low as .0025 percent.139 Coupled with antibiotics, this risk can be
lowered by another seventy-six percent,140 making medication

134. Id.
135. See generally James Trussell et al., Reduction in Infection-Related Mortality Since
Modifications in the Regimen of Medical Abortion, 89 Contraception 193, 195 (2014).
136. Humble, 753 F.3d at 908.
137. Mary Fjerstad et al., Effectiveness of medical abortion with mifepristone and buccal
misoprostol through 59 gestational days, 80“Effectiveness of medical abortion with mifepristone and
buccal misoprostol through 59 gestational days.” Contraception 282, 282–86 (2009) (finding that
complications arose in less than 1% of the procedures).
138. Id.
139. Amanda Garner, Changes Reduced Infections from Medical Abortions, ABC NEWS (July 8,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthday/story?id=8037060.
140. Id.
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abortions arguably safer than the alternative surgical procedures.
The Fifth Circuit’s failure to take this information into account was
egregious. The court stated that there was a lack of sufficient
evidence to support such claims, discrediting the expert testimony
presented by Planned Parenthood and finding that it was not
sufficient to show that an undue burden was placed upon women as a
result of these restrictions.141 In doing so, the court ignored the
multitude of other evidence that was submitted in the plaintiff’s
original motion.142 This failure by the court resulted in the merits of
Planned Parenthood’s argument to not be truly examined under the
undue burden standard set forth by the Supreme Court. Ultimately,
this error led the Fifth Circuit to erroneously decide this case against
Planned Parenthood.
B. The Effect of Additional Abortion Regulations Were Not Taken
into Consideration

In ruling against the appellees, the Fifth Circuit failed to consider
and weigh the effects of other abortion regulations that were already
in place within Texas. The myriad of existing abortion regulations
play a large role in the ability of a majority of women to access
abortion procedures. In determining whether a new piece of
legislation places an undue burden on a woman’s access to abortion,
not only do the effects of that specific law need to be taken into
consideration, the effects of existing regulations need to be weighed
and examined alongside the new restriction.
As of July 1, 2014, Texas had the following restrictions on
abortion in effect: (1) a woman must receive state-directed
counseling, including information designed to dissuade her decision,
and then wait twenty-four hours prior to procedure; (2) minors must
receive parental consent and notify their parents prior to procedure;
(3) public funding is available only in cases of life endangerment,
rape, or incest; and (4) a woman must undergo an ultrasound before
obtaining an abortion and be shown the ultrasound prior to
procedure.143 H.B. 2 adds two separate restrictions to this list: (1)
that abortion providers must have hospital admitting privileges for a

141. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 604 (5th
Cir. 2014).
142. See generally Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in
Support Thereof, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583
(2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00862-LY).
143. State
Facts
About
Abortion:
Texas,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/texas.html (last visited June 1, 2015).
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hospital within thirty miles from the place of procedure; and (2)
doctors who wish to utilize medication abortions must adhere only to
the final printing label regimen as approved by the FDA for the
administration of Misoprostol and Mifepristone.144
Instead of focusing on the impact that would result only from the
prohibitions related to medication abortions, the Fifth Circuit should
have considered that impact along with the other restrictions on
abortion that were already in place. The appearance of piecemeal
legislation adding restrictions to abortion has become very popular
amongst states who wish to add layers of red-tape and regulations
which ultimately result in the closing of abortion clinics.145 Today,
almost half of the United States has a 24-hour waiting requirement
with some states requiring as much as a 72-hour wait period.146 A
more recent wave of legislation has begun to require that doctors
perform an ultrasound on all women who seek an abortion even
though ultrasounds are not medically necessary for the procedure.147
When analyzing the constitutionality of H.B. 2, the Fifth Circuit
failed to consider the true purpose and motivation behind the law. It
is important for courts to not only take into consideration the current
restriction being challenged but to also be aware of the overlying
atmosphere of abortion regulation within the state itself. The Fifth
Circuit blindly accepted Texas’s argument that the regulation was for
the purpose of protecting maternal health without doing any
empirical analysis or further thought. Indeed, the court explicitly
stated “there is never a role for evidentiary proceedings under
rational basis review.”148 The court’s attempt to dismiss the need for
empirical evidence fails common sense. Though the burden remains
on the plaintiffs to show that the purpose of the regulation is to place
a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman seeking an abortion, the
court should not blindly accept the state’s purported rationale for the
legislation and then not permit any type of empirical analysis into
whether the legislation actually meets that purpose.

144. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 587.
145. Tara Culp-Ressler, Seven States Working Hard to Shut Down Abortion Clinics, THINK
PROGRESS (April 3, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/04/03/1815111/states-advancing-traplaws/.
146. Kate Pickert, What Missouri’s New Abortion Law Means for Women, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.time.com/3323608/missouri-lawmakers-enact-72-hour-abortion-wait/.
147. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (October 1, 2014),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. Twenty-three states have regulated
ultrasound requirements prior to abortion procedures.
148. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 596 (5th
Cir. 2014).
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This interpretation of rational-basis review fails to protect a
woman’s right to abortion and allows for states to pass these
regulations with false motives. The Fifth Circuit’s reading fell
directly into this line of thinking and failed to afford the appropriate
constitutional protection that the Supreme Court intended to extend
to women since its holding in Roe. Instead, the Fifth Circuit should
have taken an approach similar to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in
Humble. In particular, the Ninth Circuit noted that the constitutional
analysis of an abortion regulation cannot end once it is found that the
regulation has been supported by only “rational speculation.”149 It is
also necessary to consider whether the regulation has actually been
shown to advance the purported state interest.150
C. The Fifth Circuit Misunderstood the Roles of FDA Approvals

In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit demonstrates that it does not fully
understand the FDA’s approval process or the role that the FDA
plays in determining what appears on the final printing label of a
drug. This misunderstanding likely played a significant role in the
court’s decision because of the apparent credibility they gave the onlabel regimen of Misoprostol and Mifepristone while showing clear
disdain for the off-label regimen being used by doctors across the
nation.
The Fifth Circuit appeared wholly unaware of the FDA’s
regulatory authority and seemed to be taken by surprise when
learning that doctors across the nation were following an off-label
regimen in medication abortions. The court explained this usage by
stating “doctors performing such abortions in Texas, and apparently
across the country, have developed an off-label protocol that differs
from the FDA-approved version[.]”151 The ultimate result was
clearly effected by the Fifth Circuit’s lack of knowledge on this
matter. One of the main factors in the court’s rationale was that there
was a lack of evidence to show that medical abortions were actually a
safe alternative to surgical abortions. The court should have given
credibility to the off-label regimen that had been implemented across
the country and chosen as the preferred method by numerous medical
professionals. The Fifth Circuit’s apparent lack of knowledge on the
process of FDA approval of drugs led to an erroneous decision that
149. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014).
150. Id. See also Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d (7th Cir. 2013)
(the Seventh Circuit took a similar approach by weighing the extent of the burden against the state’s
justification for the regulation).
151. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 600.
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took away the power of discretion and choice from medical
professionals and women.
D. The Current Constitutional Framework Falls Short in Protecting
a Woman’s Right to Abortion

The changing landscape of abortion regulation in the United States
calls for a change in the constitutional framework that governs these
new restrictions. More protection needs to be afforded to women
who seek abortion. To accomplish this task, courts need to begin
taking a comprehensive approach towards interpreting abortion
regulations, rather than the narrow approach seen in Abbott. As more
states continue to pass laws targeting abortion clinics with supposed
goals of protecting maternal or fetal health, courts need to increase
the amount of time and effort spent determining the true purpose of
the regulations.
The optimal approach is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in
Humble. No longer should an abortion regulation be able to pass
constitutional muster simply because it can be tied to some rational
basis. Instead, the state’s justification needs to be weighed against
the burden that it creates. Additionally, courts need to actually
examine the effectiveness the law will have towards reaching that
justification. Taking a lenient approach to these regulations has
resulted in a buildup of cumulative regulations that have resulted in
the closures of more and more clinics and have placed a substantial
obstacle in the path of women who seek abortion procedures. A
better method for determining the constitutionality of new abortion
regulations would not only consider the burden that results from the
specific piece of legislation in question, but also the cumulative
effect that other abortion regulations within the state also have on a
woman’s ability to seek out an abortion.
These targeted abortion regulations have become far too common.
It can be argued that the overall goal of states in enacting this type of
legislation is not to protect the health of its citizens, but instead, to
restrict access to a procedure that the state’s legislators do not
personally believe in. This motive flies directly against the Supreme
Court’s finding that a woman’s right to abortion is constitutionally
protected. The courts only option is to react to these regulations by
changing the framework in which they are interpreted within.
V. CONCLUSION

With the continual emergence of abortion regulations across the
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United States, it is time for courts to begin examining these
regulations with a stricter constitutional interpretation. The effects of
these regulations are already affecting women in a number of states
and are undermining the constitutional protections afforded by the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. Rather than focusing strictly on each
regulation as they are individually introduced, courts need to begin
examining the burden placed upon women from the cumulative
effects of both existing abortion regulations and the new regulations
that they are reviewing.
In addition to this need, another troubling aspect of interpretation
has begun to be demonstrated. As the Fifth Circuit made clear in its
holding, the discretion and determination of what types of procedures
are safest for women should be awarded to legislators rather than
medical professionals. This troubling notion is untenable in modern
society. Medical professionals are much better equipped to make
medical decisions on a case-by-case basis rather than an outright ban
on off-label use of medication abortions. The Fifth Circuit’s
acceptance of a ban on off-label use for a particular combination of
drugs goes against a line of thinking that the FDA themselves has
said was necessary. It offends common sense to disallow doctors the
discretion to administer these two drugs while allowing them to
continue with off-label use for almost all other drugs. The decision
of whether medication abortions are the safest option for a woman
should be left up to the medical professionals not legislators. The
Fifth Circuit failed to grasp this concept and as a result struck a blow
to the constitutional protections long afforded to women.
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